I performed a static analysis of DeepSeek, forum.altaycoins.com a Chinese LLM chatbot, utilizing version 1.8.0 from the Google Play Store. The objective was to recognize possible security and privacy problems.
I've written about DeepSeek previously here.
Additional security and personal privacy concerns about DeepSeek have actually been raised.
See also this analysis by NowSecure of the iPhone variation of DeepSeek
The findings detailed in this report are based simply on static analysis. This implies that while the code exists within the app, there is no definitive proof that all of it is executed in practice. Nonetheless, the presence of such code warrants scrutiny, especially offered the growing concerns around data personal privacy, surveillance, the prospective abuse of AI-driven applications, and cyber-espionage dynamics in between international powers.
Key Findings
Suspicious Data Handling & Exfiltration
- Hardcoded URLs direct data to external servers, raising issues about user activity monitoring, such as to ByteDance "volce.com" endpoints. NowSecure identifies these in the iPhone app the other day too.
- Bespoke file encryption and information obfuscation techniques exist, with indications that they might be utilized to exfiltrate user details.
- The app contains hard-coded public keys, securityholes.science rather than counting on the user device's chain of trust.
- UI interaction tracking records detailed user behavior without clear approval.
- WebView control exists, which might enable the app to gain access to private external browser information when links are opened. More details about WebView manipulations is here
Device Fingerprinting & Tracking
A significant portion of the evaluated code appears to concentrate on gathering device-specific details, which can be used for tracking and fingerprinting.
- The app collects different distinct gadget identifiers, consisting of UDID, Android ID, IMEI, IMSI, and carrier details. - System homes, installed plans, and root detection systems suggest possible anti-tampering procedures. E.g. probes for the presence of Magisk, a tool that personal privacy advocates and security researchers use to root their Android gadgets.
- Geolocation and network profiling exist, indicating prospective tracking capabilities and allowing or disabling of fingerprinting regimes by region.
- Hardcoded gadget design lists recommend the application may behave in a different way depending upon the identified hardware.
- Multiple vendor-specific services are used to draw out additional device details. E.g. if it can not determine the device through standard Android SIM lookup (due to the fact that permission was not approved), it tries manufacturer particular extensions to access the same details.
Potential Malware-Like Behavior
While no conclusive conclusions can be drawn without dynamic analysis, bphomesteading.com a number of observed habits line up with known spyware and malware patterns:
- The app uses reflection and UI overlays, which could help with unapproved screen capture or phishing attacks. - SIM card details, genbecle.com serial numbers, and other device-specific information are aggregated for unknown purposes.
- The app executes country-based gain access to constraints and "risk-device" detection, suggesting possible surveillance mechanisms.
- The app implements calls to pack Dex modules, where additional code is filled from files with a.so extension at runtime.
- The.so submits themselves turn around and make extra calls to dlopen(), which can be used to load additional.so files. This center is not usually checked by Google Play Protect and other static analysis services.
- The.so files can be implemented in native code, such as C++. The use of native code adds a layer of complexity to the analysis procedure and obscures the complete level of the app's capabilities. Moreover, native code can be leveraged to more easily intensify privileges, potentially making use of vulnerabilities within the operating system or gadget hardware.
Remarks
While information collection prevails in contemporary applications for debugging and improving user experience, aggressive fingerprinting raises substantial privacy concerns. The DeepSeek app needs users to visit with a legitimate email, which should currently offer enough authentication. There is no valid factor for the app to aggressively collect and send distinct device identifiers, IMEI numbers, SIM card details, and other non-resettable system residential or commercial properties.
The degree of tracking observed here exceeds normal analytics practices, possibly making it possible for consistent user tracking and re-identification throughout devices. These behaviors, combined with obfuscation strategies and network communication with third-party tracking services, call for library.kemu.ac.ke a higher level of analysis from security researchers and users alike.
The employment of runtime code packing along with the bundling of native code suggests that the app could permit the implementation and execution of unreviewed, remotely delivered code. This is a severe potential attack vector. No evidence in this report is provided that from another location deployed code execution is being done, just that the facility for kenpoguy.com this appears present.
Additionally, links.gtanet.com.br the app's approach to detecting rooted gadgets appears extreme for an AI chatbot. Root detection is frequently warranted in DRM-protected streaming services, where security and content protection are important, or in competitive video games to prevent unfaithful. However, there is no clear rationale for such strict procedures in an application of this nature, raising additional questions about its intent.
Users and companies considering installing DeepSeek should understand these potential threats. If this application is being utilized within an enterprise or government environment, extra vetting and controls ought to be enforced before allowing its implementation on managed devices.
Disclaimer: The analysis presented in this report is based upon fixed code evaluation and does not indicate that all found functions are actively used. Further examination is needed for conclusive conclusions.